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This volume contains four papers presented at the BIS-sponsored sessions at the 2008 and 
2009 annual meetings of LACEA. Written by leading central bankers and distinguished 
academics, they address the challenges confronted in recent years by central banks that 
practice inflation targeting (IT) and issues arising from the global crisis.  
The first two papers were presented at the 2008 session, “Challenges to inflation targeting”, 
one by José de Gregorio (Governor of the Central Bank of Chile) and the other by Guillermo 
Calvo (professor of economics at Columbia University). Following those are papers from the 
2009 session, “Central banks and the global crisis: lessons and challenges”, one by Vittorio 
Corbo (former Governor of the Central Bank of Chile) and the other by Michael Dooley 
(professor of economics at the University of California, Santa Cruz), The papers are 
preceded by the introductory remarks of the session chairs, Már Gudmundsson (2008) and 
Philip Turner (2009). 
In his introduction to the 2008 session, “Challenges to inflation targeting”, Már 
Gudmundsson raises four issues for IT central banks. How should they deal with (i) relative 
price adjustments; (ii) financial globalisation and the role of the exchange rate; (iii) credit and 
asset price booms; and (iv) financial stability concerns? Insights on some of these questions 
were provided by the panelists.  
In his contribution, Jose de Gregorio discusses three topics confronting central banks. The 
first is price stability versus financial stability. Following the Tinbergen principle, interest rate 
policy cannot deal with both macroeconomic stability and financial stability; additional 
instruments – such as financial regulation – are needed to deal with financial stability. 
Moreover, authorities must go beyond the usual coverage in inflation reports and monitor 
quantities (eg credit growth) as well as prices.  
His second topic is the challenge of relative price shocks, such as the steep increases in 
commodity prices seen prior to the Lehman bankruptcy. Those increases were associated 
with spikes in inflation (generally above target) across the region in late 2007 and the first 
half of 2008 (see Graph 1). Had these shocks dissipated quickly, they could have been easily 
managed within an IT framework. However, they were quite persistent, threatening to 
contaminate inflation expectations. De Gregorio argues that it can be very costly to raise 
interest rates aggressively in response to such commodity price shocks, and the impact on 
inflation may be limited. The solution is to allow inflation to return to target on its own by 
maintaining a sufficiently long time horizon for the inflation target. 
Finally, De Gregorio discusses intervention in foreign exchange markets. He notes that, 
although such intervention is sometimes necessary (eg to accumulate foreign reserves), 
flexible exchange rates can serve as a shock absorber, and they pose fewer risks than in the 
past because of a lower pass-through from the exchange rate to inflation.  
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Guillermo Calvo highlights some important issues in the provision of foreign currency 
liquidity during turbulent times: First, he notes that, while foreign reserve accumulation is 
needed in the absence of an effective global lender of last resort, it is hard to determine 
when foreign reserve holdings are adequate. For example, foreign reserve adequacy in 2007 
appeared to be much higher in Asia than in Latin America according to the ratio of foreign 
reserves to short-term external debt, but it was roughly comparable in the two regions 
according to the ratio of foreign reserves to M2. He argues that the second indicator is 
preferable. Second, Calvo recognises the usefulness of facilities such as the International 
Monetary Fund’s flexible credit line (FCL) and the Federal Reserve’s foreign exchange swap 
lines but thinks that there are some issues, such as the fact that not many countries have 
access, and the relatively short duration of these facilities. Third, Calvo points out that 
drawing down foreign reserves must be done with care because it can trigger capital flight. 
Furthermore, foreign reserve use is more effective if it targets specific sectors of the 
economy, such as the export sector. Calvo concludes with the observation that the global 
crisis has shown the need to include credit in macroeconomic models. He also notes that 
treasury bills may be close substitutes for money, in which case foreign exchange market 
intervention may play an important role in adjusting liquidity. 
In his introductory remarks for the 2009 session, “Central banks and the global crisis: lessons 
and challenges”, Philip Turner outlines three possible perspectives on the policy lessons of 
the crisis. One is microeconomic – regulators did not provide an effective counterweight to 
market failures in the banking industry. A second is macroeconomic – an overly narrow focus 
on price stability led central banks to neglect financial stability. A third is macroprudential – 
not enough attention was paid to linkages between the macroeconomy and the financial 
system. 
In addressing these issues, Vittorio Corbo looks at two central bank roles: financial crisis 
prevention and crisis management. With respect to crisis prevention, Corbo argues that 
monetary authorities have to move away from the “clean up after the bubble” paradigm to 
one in which monetary policy “leans against the wind”. This may require a more discretionary 
and judgmental approach to asset prices. Furthermore, management of the policy interest 
rate is not enough for crisis prevention; central banks need to rely on other tools, including 
macroprudential policies (eg loan loss provisioning rules, capital standards and reserve 
requirements), procedures to deal with the failure of systemically important institutions, and 
intervention to avoid large misalignments of the exchange rate. Corbo sees macroprudential 
regulation as the best way to preserve financial stability by (i) reducing the incentives for 
increasing leverage during a boom and (ii) increasing the robustness of the system during a 
bust.  
With respect to crisis management, central banks must contain the damage of crises and 
limit their impact on the real economy. In particular, it is necessary to calm markets, reduce 
uncertainty due to liquidity restrictions, and, if no resolution mechanisms exist, prevent the 
collapse of systemically important institutions that could induce further damage to the 
system, even if they are insolvent. To achieve these financial stability goals, central banks 
need to offer extensive liquidity support against good collateral, reduce the policy rate 
aggressively and rely on non-conventional policies. Increasing their cooperation with fiscal 
authorities would complete the policy response. 
Finally, Michael Dooley argues that the monetary policy lessons being drawn from the crisis 
are wrong and that discussions in international forums about countercyclical prudential 
regulation are based on a misinterpretation of what caused the crisis. In Dooley’s view, easy 
monetary policy in the United States had nothing to do with the crisis. In particular, 
notwithstanding global imbalances, there was no sudden stop in capital flows from emerging 
market economies (EMEs) to advanced countries, no spike in US real long-term interest 
rates and no collapse in the US dollar.  
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Dooley also argues that current regulatory proposals will do little because firms will find a 
way around regulations. Crises arise because profit motives and competition push leverage 
to unsustainable levels. There may be no set of regulations that can deal with the conflict 
between the profitability of leverage and the vulnerability of the system to leverage unless the 
system is pushed way beyond its efficient frontier. Therefore, he concludes, regulation is 
futile. What is needed is much stronger supervision. He identified three false assumptions 
that render supervision ineffectual: (i) private financial institutions care about the long-run 
value of the firm; (ii) markets impose self-discipline; (iii) private rating agencies are superior 
to government agencies in evaluating risk.  
Dooley makes two other points. First, he argues that crises are costly because they involve 
the disappearance of collateral outside the insured system, so the role of the changing value 
of collateral in crises needs more attention. Second, he suggests that although foreign 
reserves did not hurt, they helped little in insulating EMEs because the cause of the crisis 
was a failure in supervision and regulation. Federal Reserve swap lines with EME central 
banks and the flexible credit line (FCL) of the International Monetary Fund, although useful, 
are also of little help in insulating economies from such crises.  
Graph 1 
Inflation and policy rates in inflation targeting countries 
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1  Annual change in consumer prices, in percent.    
2  Targets announced, in terms of CPI.    
3  Forecasts made in 
January 2010 for year-end 2010, Consensus Economics.   
4    For Brazil, SELIC overnight rate. For Chile, 
monetary policy rate. For Colombia, expansion minimum intervention date. For Mexico, prior to 2008, bank
funding rate; after 2008, reference rate. For Peru, interbank rate. For Guatemala, “tasa lider”. For Uruguay,
monetary policy rate. For Canada, overnight rate. 
Sources: IMF; Datastream; Consensus Economics; national data. 